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No. 241

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964.

JAMES B. CLOWER, DAN McWILLIAMS,
and CLYDE RECTOR, Intervenors,

Petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and
TENNESSEE PRODUCTS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
ROANE ELECTRIC FURNACE DIVISION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

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JAMES B. CLOWER, DAN McWILLIAMS, and CLYDE RECTOR, Intervenors,

Petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and TENNESSEE PRODUCTS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, ROANE ELECTRIC FURNACE DIVISION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

The petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the Order Denying Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered April 1, 1964.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The consent decree entered by the Court of Appeals on April 8, 1963, is unreported. (See Appendix, page 6.) The Order Denying Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis is reported at 329 F. 2nd 873. (See Appendix, page 6.)

JURISDICTION.

The Order of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was made and entered April 1, 1964, and a copy is set out in the Appendix hereto at page 7. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. Section 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED.

Can workers who were deprived of their jobs by a consent decree entered by the Court of Appeals, but who were not parties to the proceeding leading to the consent decree and had no notice thereof until after the decree was final, obtain relief from said decree by petition to said Court of Appeals?

CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES AND AMENDMENTS INVOLVED.

Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States reads in part:

> "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. * * *. (etc.)"

Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States reads in part:

> "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, * * * (etc.)"

Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States reads in part:

> "No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; (etc.)."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

During the course of a strike the Tennessee Products and Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, fired the strikers. These strikers were represented by the United Steelworkers of America, AF[illegible]-CIO. After discharging the strikers, about two hundred replacements were hired, including the petitioners here.

The union filed with the N. L. R. B. a charge that Tennessee Products was guilty of an unfair labor practice in firing the strikers. The Trial Examiner found this true as to seventy-seven of the strikers (who were ordered rehired with back pay), but not as to the remainder, about three hundred and twenty. Without a hearing before the N. L. R. B., and without notice to the petitioners, or any opportunity to intervene, the dispute was settled by the entry of an agreed order providing for the reinstatement of all of the approximately four hundred discharged strikers, but without back pay. A decree of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, entered by agreement, enforced this N. L. R. B. order. As a consequence, the two hundred replacements have been discharged.

An attempt to obtain relief in the State Chancery Court was held to be improper, since the Federal Government (NLRB) has preempted the field. The N. L. R. B. refused to entertain an unfair labor charge. When a petition was filed with the Court of Appeals, that Court held that it had no power to grant any relief.

The confused state of this case is exemplified by the fact that although James B. Clower, Dan McWilliams and Clyde Rector filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis through their own counsel, and although this Court of Appeals considered same and disallowed it (See Appendix, pp. 7-9), they received no notice of the Court's action, were not listed in the Advance Sheets (See 329 F. 2nd 873), nor was there any listing of their attorney of record.

This petition for certiorari is directed to the refusal of the Court of Appeals to grant the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

The Court of Appeals has held that it has authority to enter an enforcement order that affects these petitioners here, without notice to the petitioners and without opportunity to them to intervene or obtain relief, and has held that the sole remedy of the petitioners is through the NLRB. As stated in the order, *N. L. R. B. vs. Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp.*, 329 F. 2nd 873,

> "Congress has invested the N. L. R. B. and its agents with powers which, if withheld or abused, can visit serious and irreparable harm upon those who, under the scheme of the N. L. R. B. cannot obtain the help of judicial intervention. Foreclosed as we are from entrance by judicial writ into such a situation, we must leave an injured party to the assistance of those empowered to apply administrative remedies or executive correction." (Repeated from *Dunn v. Retail Clerks*, 307 F. 2nd 289.)

This states clearly that the judicial power of the United States, instead of being vested in the courts, is vested in the N. L. R. B., but is "enforced" by the courts, not by the exercise of judicial discretion, but by lending the executive branch the name and influence of the judicial branch. This is never a proper use of the judicial power—the very essence of the judicial power is not enforcement, but weighing and deciding. It is particularly out of place here, where the approximately two hundred injured parties are being deprived of their jobs (a property right) without due process of law but with the sanction of the judiciary branch, while the sanctioning judiciary branch, like Pilate, washes its hands and says it has no power to judge.

CONCLUSION.

Some form of relief, somewhere, should be available to these petitioners.

Respectfully submitted,

JAC CHAMBLISS,
Counsel for Petitioners.

APPENDIX.

CONSENT DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

THIS CAUSE was submitted upon the petition of the National Labor Relations Board for the enforcement of a certain order issued by it against Respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, its officers, agents, successors and assigns on March 22, 1963, in a proceeding before the said Board numbered 10-CA-4850; upon the transcript of the record in said proceeding, certified and filed in this Court, and upon a stipulation providing for the entry of a consent decree of this Court enforcing the order.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that the said order of the National Labor Relations Board be, and the same is hereby enforced; and that Respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, its officers, agents, successors and assigns abide by and perform the direction of the Board in said order contained.

/s/ CLIFFORD O'SULLIVAN,

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS.

Before O'SULLIVAN, PHILLIPS, and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.

This matter is presented to us by a pleading entitled Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis. On April 8, 1963, this court, in this cause, entered a consent decree enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board. This order, entered pursuant to a settlement agreement between the National Labor Relations Board and respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, required, *inter alia*, that respondent rehire certain employees that it had discharged during the course of a strike, laying off, if necessary, employees who had replaced such discharged employees. The pleading before us is signed by three of such laid off employees. The relief sought is the vacation of our order of April 8, 1963, and the doing of "whatever is required by law and justice."

The petition avers the following facts as the grounds for relief. During the course of a strike respondent discharged the strikers. These employees were represented by United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Respondent company then began to replace the discharged strikers with other men, among which were petitioners.[1]

The AFL-CIO union, on behalf of the discharged strikers, thereupon filed with the NLRB a charge that respondent company was guilty of an unfair labor practice in discharging the strikers. A hearing was had and a Trial Examiner's report found that the company had violated the Act, by discharging some seventy-seven of the striking employees. The report held, however, that the remaining

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[1] Petitioners assert that some 200 replacements were hired, and we assume that the named petitioners seek to assert the rights of all in that class.

strikers were not, during the work stoppage, engaged in a protected activity. The company was ordered to reinstate the seventy-seven. The Union and the Board's general counsel took exception to the Trial Examiner's report and contended that all strikers, a total of about four hundred, should be reinstated with back pay. Pending hearing before the Board, a settlement was reached whereby the company agreed to an order calling for the reinstatement of all the discharged Union members, laying off, if necessary, those that had replaced them. Our decree of April 8, 1963, enforced such order. We are asked coram nobis to vacate our decree.

While coram nobis, as a civil writ, was abolished by Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it was permitted survival or revival in criminal practice by *United States v. Morgan*, 346 U. S. 502, 98 L. Ed. 248. Our function in litigation arising under the National Labor Relations Act is well defined by that Act, and we find nothing therein giving us the right to entertain original applications for writs of error coram nobis. We doubt, too, whether in such matters we have any general equity powers.

Apart, however, from procedural labels, we do not think that the present address to us calls for or permits action on our part. We need not decide whether the present petitioners would or should have been allowed to intervene in the above-entitled cause, had a request therefor been made to the NLRB or to us before the matter was finalized by our decree. After our decree, one or more of the present petitioners did file with the appropriate Regional Director of the NLRB a charge asserting that what was accomplished by the carrying out of the settlement, approved and enforced by our decree, and which resulted in the layoff of some or all of those who replaced the reinstated strikers, was an unfair labor practice. The Regional

Director of the NLRB, as well as its general counsel, refused to issue a complaint. In the case of *Dunn v. Retail Clerks*, 307 F. (2d) 285 (CA 6, 1962), we held that neither a District Court nor ourselves have power, by mandamus or otherwise, to command the NLRB to issue such a complaint. Such, too, was the holding in *Hourihan v. NLRB*, 201 F. (2d) 187 (CA.—D. C., 1952), cert. den. 346 U. S. 930, and *Bandlow v. Rothman*, 278 F. (2d) 866 (CA.—D. C., 1960), cert. den. 364 U. S. 909. As we stated in *Dunn v. Retail Clerks, supra*:

> "Congress has invested the N. L. R. B. and its agents with powers which, if withheld or abused, can visit serious and irreparable harm upon those who, under the scheme of the N. L. R. A., cannot obtain the help of judicial intervention. Foreclosed as we are from entrance by judicial writ into such a situation, we must leave an injured party to the assistance of those empowered to apply administrative remedies or executive correction." (307 F. (2d) 289.)

The petition before us also infers that when the petitioners were hired as replacements for the strikers, promises were made which might give them some contractual rights to continued employment. But, whatever the status of petitioners' alleged contractual rights, this court is not the forum in which to vindicate them. Our function is fundamentally appellate in NLRB matters. It has been held that, since administrative bodies are created to serve the public interest, they are not a proper forum for the litigation of private contractual rights. *Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.*, 309 U. S. 261, 268, 84 L. Ed. 738, 743 (1939).

The petition now before us is denied.

Approved for entry.

CLIFFORD O'SULLIVAN,
United States Circuit Judge.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

No. 241

JAMES B. CLOWER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The court of appeals' order denying a petition for a writ of error *coram nobis* (Pet. 7–9) is reported at 329 F. 2d 873. The earlier decree of the court of appeals, enforcing a settlement agreement approved by the Board (Pet. 6), is unreported.[1]

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals order denying the petition for a writ of error *coram nobis* (Pet. 7–9) was entered on

[1] The settlement agreement, and the Board order entered pursuant thereto, are set forth in Appendix B, *infra*, pp. 13–24.

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April 1, 1964. On July 1, 1964, Mr. Justice Clark extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including July 6, 1964. The petition was filed on July 2, 1964. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

The National Labor Relations Board, the union, and the employer entered into an agreement in settlement of unfair labor practice charges brought by the union against the employer. The Board order made pursuant to this agreement required the employer to reinstate certain strikers. This order was enforced by the court of appeals. The question presented is whether the court of appeals properly refused to upset the settlement agreement upon the subsequent petition of employees who had replaced the strikers and who were displaced as a result of the employer's compliance with the agreement to reinstate the strikers.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151, *et seq.*) are set forth in Appendix A, *infra*, pp. 9–12.

STATEMENT

In September, 1961, about 400 of the production employees at the Rockwood, Tennessee, plant of Tennessee Products and Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division ("the Company"), who were represented by the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO ("the Union"), went on strike. The

Company fired the strikers and hired approximately 200 replacements, among whom were the present petitioners. (Pet. 2.)

The Union filed charges with the Board, alleging that the Company had violated Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act by discharging the strikers, and a complaint was issued by the General Counsel of the Board. After hearing, the trial examiner, on June 14, 1962, issued his report. He found that 77 of the employees were justified in striking—notwithstanding a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement—because their working conditions were abnormally dangerous,[1] but that the strike by the remaining employees was in breach of contract. He recommended that the 77 employees be reinstated with back pay. Exceptions to the examiner's report were filed with the Board. (Pet. 3, 7–8.)

On February 19, 1963, the Company, the Union, and a representative of the Board entered into a formal settlement of the unfair labor practice charges. In pursuance of this settlement, the Board entered an order [1a] on March 22, 1963, which directed, *inter alia*, that the Company (1) reinstate all 77 employees found to have been directly affected by the abnormally dangerous working conditions; (2) reinstate another group of employees who had participated in the work stoppage; and (3) terminate the discharges of the remaining strikers not thus reinstated and place them

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[1] See Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act (*infra*, p. 12).

[1a] The settlement agreement and the Board order are set forth in Appendix B, *infra*, pp. 13–24.

on a master seniority list. The Board's order provided further that, in effecting the reinstatements, "there shall be laid off an equivalent number of employees hired for the first time after September 11, 1961 [five days after the beginning of the strike]." (Appendix B, *infra*, p. 21.) In addition to making provision for the Board order, the settlement agreement gives consent to a court of appeals decree enforcing the Board order. (*Id.* at p. 15.) On April 8, 1963, the court of appeals entered such a consent decree. (Pet. 6, 7.) The Company thereafter complied with all the portions of the decree.

In December, 1963, petitioners, who were displaced when the Company reinstated the strikers, requested the court of appeals to issue a writ of error *coram nobis* setting aside the April 8 decree enforcing the Board's order. Petitioners alleged that they had not received actual notice of the settlement agreement when it was pending before the Board, that they therefore had no opportunity to present arguments to the Board as to why the settlement agreement should not have been approved by the Board, and that they had not received official notice of the court of appeals' enforcement proceeding and were not joined as parties thereto. They alleged that the failure to notify them of the pending settlement agreement before the Board was the product of a "conspiracy" between the Board, the Union and the Company. In addition, petitioners alleged that the settlement agreement was illegal because the Union did not represent the Company's employees when the agree-

ment was made.[3] (Appendix C, *infra,* pp. 25–31.) The court of appeals refused to issue the writ or to vacate its earlier decree (Pet. 7–9), holding that the court had no jurisdiction in such a case to entertain an original application for a writ of error *coram nobis* and that "apart * * * from procedural labels, we do not think that the present address to us calls for or permits action on our part."

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court below is correct. No issue warranting review by this Court is presented.

Petitioners asked the court of appeals to set aside its previous enforcement of the Board order on two grounds: (1) that the settlement agreement upon which the Board order was predicated was illegal because the Union was not the bargaining representative of the Company's employees when the agreement was made; (2) that petitioners had no adequate opportunity to participate in the Board proceedings leading up to the settlement agreement. Neither of these grounds is substantial.

With regard to the first ground of attack upon the Board order, it is wholly irrelevant in considering the legality of the settlement whether or not the Union

[3] Before filing the petition for a writ of error *coram nobis*, the same group of employees, plus Harold Stamey, filed a suit in the Chancery Court, Hamilton County, Chattanooga, Tennessee, against the Company; that court dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, Stamey filed a charge alleging in substance that the Company, by complying with the consent decree, violated Sections 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the Act (Board Case No. 10–CA–5445); the General Counsel of the Board dismissed the charge. (Pet. 3, 8–9.)

was the bargaining representative of the Company's employees at the time the agreement was reached. The Union properly participated in the settlement as the charging party before the Board. The Act contains no requirement that a union be the bargaining representative of a group of employees in order to bring or to participate in unfair labor practice charges which seek merely to remedy discrimination against the employees and not to impose a bargaining obligation on the employer. In any event, the Union, which concededly was the bargaining agent of the Company's employees when the strike commenced, continued to enjoy that status, if, as the Union charged, the discharge of the strikers and their replacement by non-union workers constituted an unfair labor practice. The Board was therefore clearly entitled to permit the Union to participate in the settlement.

With regard to petitioners' second ground of attack upon the Board order, petitioners had no absolute right to participate in the Board proceeding for they were not indispensable parties. *National Licorice Co.* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 309 U.S. 350, 366. Even if, as alleged, the Company made contractual promises to these petitioners (Pet. 9), their private rights against the employer, if any, were left to adjudication in tribunals other than the Board. *Ibid.* As to possible intervention in the Board proceeding, section 10(b) of the Act provides that "[i]n the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the

hearing or the Board, any other person [in addition to the Board, the charging party, and the party charged with the unfair practice] may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony." Nevertheless, petitioners, who do not claim that they lacked actual notice of the pendency of the Board proceeding against the Company, made no attempt to intervene in that proceeding under section 10(b). Having thus failed even to attempt intervention before the Board, petitioners may not now complain of their lack of participation in the proceedings.

Even if petitioners had presented substantial reasons for questioning the validity of the Board's order, their right to compel the court of appeals to reopen its consideration of the order eight months after the court's decree of enforcement would be open to serious doubt. In this case, where petitioners' attacks were insubstantial, the court of appeals clearly committed no error in refusing to reverse its previous decree and deny enforcement to the Board order.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

ARCHIBALD COX,
Solicitor General.

ARNOLD ORDMAN,
General Counsel,
DOMINICK L. MANOLI,
Associate General Counsel,
NORTON J. COME,
Assistant General Counsel,
LAURENCE S. GOLD,
Attorney,
National Labor Relations Board.

JULY 1964.

APPENDIX A

The relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151, *et seq.*) are as follows:

SEC. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;

(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: *Provided,* That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay;

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: * * *

* * * * *

SEC. 10.

* * * * *

(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member there-

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of, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint: * * * The person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the * * * complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. * * *

SEC. 10 (e) [As amended, 72 Stat. 945.] The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, * * * within any circuit * * * wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, and shall file in the court the record in the proceedings, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evi-

dence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the record. * * * Upon the filing of the record with it the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the * * * Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28.

(f) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part of relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any circuit court of appeals of the United States in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Board, and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, certified by the Board, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e) of this section, and shall have the same jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the

Board; the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive.

* * * * * *

The relevant provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended (61 Stat. 162, 29 U.S.C. 141, 143), are as follows:

SEC. 502. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require an individual employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor shall anything in this Act be construed to make the quitting of his labor by an individual employee an illegal act; nor shall any court issue any process to compel the performance by an individual employee of such labor or service, without his consent; nor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this Act.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Case No. 10–CA–4850

TENNESSEE PRODUCTS & CHEMICAL CORPORATION, ROANE ELECTRIC FURNACE DIVISION

AND

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL–CIO

STIPULATION

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Employer", the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and Counsel for the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, Tenth Regional Office, that:

1. Upon a charge filed by the Union in Case No. 10–CA–4850, on November 13, 1961, and served upon the Employer, receipt of which charge is hereby acknowledged by said Employer, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred to as the "Board", by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, acting pursuant to authority granted in Section 10(b) of the Act, hereinafter referred to as the "Act", and Section 102.15 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing on December 28, 1961, receipt of which Complaint and Notice

of Hearing is hereby acknowledged by the Employer.

2. Thereafter, pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held before the Board's Trial Examiner Owsley Vose at Knoxville, Tennessee, on February 12–16, 1962. At such hearing, all the parties hereto appeared, were represented by counsel, and were afforded an opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to present oral argument. Subsequent to the hearing, all parties hereto filed briefs with the Trial Examiner.

3. On or about June 14, 1962, the Trial Examiner issued, and caused to be served upon the parties hereto, an Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, receipt of which Intermediate Report and Recommended Order is hereby acknowledged by all the parties hereto, wherein he recommended that the allegations of the Complaint be sustained in part and that they be dismissed in part. On the date of issuance of said Intermediate Report, the Board issued an Order, receip of which Order is hereby acknowledged by all the parties hereto, transferring the case to and continuing it before the Board.

4. Thereafter, all the parties hereto, pursuant to Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, filed briefs and exceptions with the Board in support of their respective positions as to the allegations of the Complaint and findings and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.

5. The parties hereto hereby agree that, contingent upon approval of the instant Stipulation by the Board and entry of an Order by the Board, they hereby withdraw all pending exceptions and briefs now before the Board and expressly waive any and all further and additional rights to hearings, intermediate reports, the filing of exceptions and briefs, oral arguments before the Board, the making of

findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Board, and any and all further procedure and proceedings before the Board. Further, the parties hereto expressly waive any and all further and additional rights that they may have under Sections 10 (d), (e) and (f) of the Act, and under Sections 102.52 through 102.59 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8 as amended, except as herein otherwise indicated.

6. The parties hereto agree that upon this Stipulation and the record, as hereinafter described, the Board may, without further notice of proceedings herein, enter an Order that is in conformity with the terms and conditions of this Stipulation and which conforms to the language hereinafter set forth under the provisions of this Stipulation entitled "Order".

7. The parties hereto hereby agree that the Board, in the event that it approves the instant Stipulation, shall have the right to apply to or petition the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, or any other United States Court of Appeals of an appropriate circuit, for a Decree enforcing the Board's Order issued in conformity with the terms of this Stipulation. All the parties hereto waive their rights to oppose or defend against the entry of such a Decree, and all parties hereby waive their rights to receive notice of the filing of an application for the entry of such Decree, provided that such Decree is in conformity with the words and figures set forth hereinafter under the subsection hereof entitled "Order"[1].

8. The parties hereto stipulate and agree that the

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[1] It is understood and agreed that in the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Decree of a United States Court of Appeals that therein there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order", the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order * * *."

charge, the Complaint, the Answer, the Intermediate Report, and this Stipulation shall constitute the entire record herein. All parties hereto agree that the Board, in the event that it seeks to exercise its power to petition for enforcement pursuant to Section 10(e) of the Act, shall only be required to file with the Court a copy of the instant Stipulation and the Order issued in conformity thereto.

9. All the parties hereto agree that in the event the Board petitions for and is successful in obtaining a Decree from an appropriate United States Court of Appeals, such Decree will be deemed as a full and final disposition of any and all issues covered by the instant charges, and all parties hereto waive and relinquish any and all rights to appeal from or contest such Decree.

10. It is the intention of all the parties herein and hereto to settle and adjust all the issues raised by the Union's charge, the General Counsel's Complaint, and the Intermediate Report, alleging the commission of unfair labor practices by the Employer. All the parties to the instant Stipulation acknowledge that the instant settlement is being entered into by each of them and all of them for the purpose of resolving in an equitable manner consistent with the interests of the employees, the parties and the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, the issues between them raised by the Charge, the Complaint and the Intermediate Report and also for the purpose of avoiding the onerous and burdensome delays and expenses of the extensive litigation that would otherwise result from further processing of this matter.

11. It is understood and agreed to by all the parties hereto that the action of the Employer in entering into this Agreement does not in any way constitute an admission on its part that it, its agents, servants

or employees have engaged in, or are engaged in, any acts or conduct which are violative of the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act. It is understood and agreed to that the instant Stipulation is not to be construed as an acknowledgement by the Employer as to the validity of the allegations of General Counsel's Complaint, and that the Employer enters into the instant Stipulation merely for the purpose of compromise and in order to avoid the heavy costs and expenses of continued litigation.

12. (a) The Employer is, and has been at all times herein material, a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Tennessee.

(b) The Employer annually ships goods valued in excess of $50,000.00 from its manufacturing facilities in Tennessee to points and persons located outside such State. It is stipulated, conceded and agreed to by all the parties herein that the Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sections 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.

13. It is stipulated to and agreed that the Union is, and has been at all times material hereto, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

14. This Stipulation, together with the various other documents referred to heretofore above and hereinafter, constitutes the entire record in the instant proceedings. It is further agreed that this Stipulation contains the entire Agreement between the parties disposing of the alleged unfair labor practices and is a full and final disposition of all of the allegations contained in the General Counsel's Complaint and the issues raised thereby, there being no agreement of any kind, verbally or otherwise, which alters this Stipulation.

15. Upon this Stipulation and the record herein, and without further notice or proceedings, all parties hereto specifically hereby waiving requirements for any such notice, the Board shall enter an Order providing substantially as follows:

[ORDER OMITTED]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Case No. 10–CA–4850

TENNESSEE PRODUCTS & CHEMICAL CORPORATION, ROANE ELECTRIC FURNACE DIVISION

AND

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL–CIO

DECISION AND ORDER

Statement of the Case

On June 14, 1962, Trial Examiner Owsley Vose issued his Intermediate Report and Recommended Order in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it take specific action to remedy such unfair labor practices. Thereafter, all parties filed exceptions and briefs with the Board in support of their respective positions as to the allegations of the Complaint and findings and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.

Thereafter, on February 18, 1963, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, herein called the Respondent; United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, herein called the Union; and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, entered into a Stipulation, in settle-

ment of the case, subject to approval of the Board, providing for the entry of a consent order by the Board and a consent decree by any appropriate United States Court of Appeals. The parties withdrew their exceptions and briefs and waived all further and other procedure before the Board to which they may be entitled under the Act, and the Rules and Regulations of the Board, and waived their right to contest the entry of a consent decree or to receive further notice of the application therefor.

The aforesaid Stipulation is hereby approved and made a part of the record herein, and the proceeding is hereby transferred to and continued before the Board for the entry of a Decision and Order, pursuant to the provisions of the said Stipulation.

Upon the basis of the aforesaid Stipulation and the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The business of the Respondent

Respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, a Tennessee corporation, annually ships goods valued in excess of $50,000.00 from its manufacturing facilities in Tennessee to points and persons located outside the State of Tennessee. The Respondent admits, and we find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.

2. The labor organization involved

United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

ORDER

Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, the Stipulation, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that:

The Respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, its officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Discharging employees for engaging in strike or concerted activities protected by the Act, or in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join or assist any labor organization to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

(b) Discouraging membership in the International Union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by discharging employees or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of their employment.

2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended:

(a) As promptly as possible consistent with operating requirements, recall the employees found by the Trial Examiner to have been affected by the alleged abnormally dangerous working

conditions at its plant on September 5 and 6, 1961. The names of all such affected employees (seventy-seven in number) are contained in Appendix "B" hereto, which is hereby incorporated into this Order as a part hereof. The employees recalled pursuant to this Section 2(a) shall be recalled in an order consistent with seniority subject to operating requirements and there shall be laid off an equivalent number of employees hired for the first time after September 11, 1961.

(b) In addition to the recall of the employees provided for in Paragraph 2(a) above, as promptly as possible consistent with operating requirements, recall a number of employees who participated in the work stoppage which shall represent the difference between said number of seventy-seven (77) and the number which is equal to two-thirds (⅔) of the total number of employees actively at work in the bargaining unit on the date of this Order. The employees recalled pursuant to this Section 2(b) shall be recalled in an order consistent with seniority subject to operating requirements and there shall be laid off an equivalent number of employees hired for the first time after September 11, 1961.

(c) Terminate all discharges communicated to its employees beginning September 11, 1961 and arising out of the work stoppage beginning on or about September 6, 1961. Pay to each of said employees who was actively at work in the bargaining unit on September 6, 1961 an amount of money herein agreed to be the net amount due him as a result of such discharge. The names of all such employees are contained in Appendix "C" hereto, which is hereby incorporated into this Order as a part hereof, and the amount of money

due each such employee appears opposite such employee's name.

The employees whose discharges are terminated pursuant to this Paragraph 2(c) but who are not recalled to work pursuant to the provisions of Paragraphs 2 (a) or (b) hereof shall be restored to the master seniority list referred to in Paragraph 2(d) below.

(d) Establish a master seniority list containing the names of all persons who were employees in the collective bargaining unit on September 6, 1961 and all persons hired thereafter who are now at work and those who have rights to recall. Such seniority list is attached hereto as Appendix "D", which is hereby incorporated into this Order as a part hereof. The employees on said list have been ranked in order of seniority for recall purposes. There are no other employees or former employees who have any seniority rights as of the date of this Stipulation.

(e) In the event that a person to be recalled in accordance with the provisions of this Order is not qualified to do the work, the next highest ranked employee qualified to do the work will be recalled. The Company is directed to work out reasonable notice and reporting requirements with the Union in order to implement the provisions of this Order.

(f) Recalls under the provisions of Paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) hereof will be accomplished as quickly as possible and in any event within (30) days from the date the job becomes available and the Employer is advised of the employee's availability to perform such job.

(g) A recalled employee shall be required to be examined by a Company physician for the purpose of determining whether he has incurred any injury or illness which will prevent him from performing his job.

(h) Post in conspicuous places in its plant at Rockwood, Tennessee, including all places where notices to employees are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as Appendix "A", which Appendix is hereby incorporated into and is to become a part of this Order. Copies of said Notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Employer's representative, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Employer to insure the said Notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.

(i) Upon entry of a Court Decree enforcing this Order, the Employer shall notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, in writing, within twenty (20) days after notice of entry of such Decree, as to the steps taken by the Respondent to comply herewith.

Dated, Washington, D.C., March 22, 1963.

FRANK W. McCULLOCH,
Chairman,

PHILIP RAY RODGERS,
Member,

BOYD LEEDOM,
Member,

JOHN H. FANNING,
Member,

GERALD A. BROWN,
Member,

National Labor Relations Board.

[SEAL]

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 15,343

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, PETITIONER

vs.

TENNESSEE PRODUCTS & CHEMICAL CORPORATION, ROANE ELECTRIC FURNACE DIVISION, RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS

Petitioners for a writ of error coram nobis, who seek to intervene in this cause, are citizens of Tennessee.

The National Labor Relations Board, which is mentioned as the petitioner in this cause, is an administrative body duly constituted by the Congress of the United States for the purpose of enforcing certain statutes of the United States dealing with matters of labor relations. The Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, which appears as respondent in this case, is a Tennessee corporation having plants in Tennessee and engaging in interstate commerce so as to be within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, which is mentioned in the transcript of the record in the proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board at the time of the consent decree, is a labor

organization doing business in Tennessee and throughout the United States.

Petitioners respectfully file this their petition for a writ of error coram nobis in this cause and would show unto the Court the following:

This Honorable Court heretofore and on the 8th day of April, 1963, put down an order in this cause, said order being designated a consent decree.

This order was put down without any notice thereof being given to petitioners and without their being a party thereto, although their rights were involved therein, as hereinafter set forth:

1. Petitioners are a part of a group of approximately two hundred (200) employees of Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division.

2. In September 1961 the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, hereinafter called the Union, had a contract as representing the employees of Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division (which will hereinafter be called Tennessee Products), said contract providing that the Union would be recognized as representing the company's plant, said strike being in violation of provision for wages, hours and working conditions. This contract provided that it would terminate on September 15, 1962.

3. In September 1961, the Union struck at the company's plant, said strike being in violation of the then existing labor contract.

4. Following the calling of this strike, the company, which had been repeatedly harrassed by a series of such illegal strikes, discharged the approximately four hundred fifteen (415) employees who had gone on said strike and began to replace said strikers with other

workers, most of whom had never worked for the company before.

5. In hiring these workers to replace the discharged strikers, the company represented that it was hiring them on a permanent rather than a temporary basis, and that if said employees would accept employment, the company would protect them in their job rights and in the event the Union sought to force the re-employment of the discharged employees through the medium of the National Labor Relations Board, the company would contest such re-employment through the Supreme Court of the United States.

6. Petitioners and their fellow employees, totaling approximately two hundred (200), accepted employment by the company under these terms and went to work for the company, with the result that with a work force of less than fifty percent (50%) of that formerly employed, the company operated with a better production record than it had prior to the strike.

7. Thereafter the Union filed charges against the company before the National Labor Relations Board, claiming that the company's action in discharging the four hundred fifteen (415) strikers was unlawful. This was done in Case 10–CA–4850, to which reference is made, the contents of this file having heretofore been filed with this Court, according to the consent decree.

8. Petitioners were not parties to the aforesaid proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board.

9. As reflected by the file in said case, a hearing officer was assigned to hear the case and after hearing the same, he ruled that although approximately seventy-seven (77) of the discharged strikers were justified in striking, because of dangerous working conditions, and should be rehired, all the rest of the

four hundred fifteen (415) strikers had been lawfully discharged. He therefore recommended that the company be required to reinstate the seventy-seven (77) and to pay them back pay.

10. Thereafter, the company announced to these petitioners and their fellow employees that the decision would be appealed to the Courts.

11. However, instead of appealing said decision, which was handed down in the summer of 1962, the company, without advising petitioners and their fellow employees, subsequently entered into a conspiracy and deal with the Union and with representatives of the National Labor Relations Board which violated the rights of the petitioners and their fellow employees and unlawfully and unconstitutionally deprived them of their rights and their jobs, said conspiracy consisting of the actions hereinafter alleged.

12. The company, being fearful that it would have to pay the sum of approximately one million dollars to the 77 employees whom it had been ordered to rehire, agreed that if the Union would drop the demands insofar as said back pay was concerned, the company would not only rehire those 77 Union members who had been held to have been wrongfully discharged, but would also rehire substantially all the other strikers who had been ruled to have been lawfully discharged and would discharge petitioners and their fellow employees in order to effect this.

13. The Union, the company and the National Labor Relations Board (secretly, insofar as the then company employees were concerned) agreed to this action, thus depriving the 77 wrongfully discharged employees of their rights to back pay and also depriving petitioners and their fellow employees of their rights and their jobs, illegally and unconstitutionally.

14. This action was illegal because in March of

1963, when this agreement was reached and a new contract signed by the company and the Union, the Union did not actually represent the employees of the company because of the fact that their contract with the company had expired in September of 1962 and it was obvious on the face of the record that thereafter they were not the bargaining agency for the employees of the company, who at that time consisted of petitioners and their fellow employees.

15. The action was unconstitutional because of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it deprived petitioners and their fellow employees of their property rights and their jobs without due process of law in that they were not advised as to what was being done and were given no opportunity to appear and present their side of the case whatsoever, said action being taken by the National Labor Relations Board and the company and the Union in a secret and surreptitious manner insofar as these petitioners and their fellow employees were concerned, it being some weeks later before petitioners and their fellow employees found out anything about it.

16. The individuals involved who acted on behalf of the parties in this cause were Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Assistant General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, and Joseph Bell, attorney for the company. Petitioners herein do not know the name of the individual who acted on behalf of the Union, but charge that said information can be furnished by the individuals heretofore named.

17. Following their discovery of the situation, petitioners and their fellow employees employed counsel who undertook to obtain relief through the National Labor Relations Board by filing a charge with that

organization on August 23, 1963, it being hoped that the Labor Board would take some action to undo the grossly unfair and illegal arrangement that had been made and entered into.

18. However, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board in Atlanta refused to issue a complaint.

19. Thereafter, an appeal was taken to the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, and under date of November 6, 1963, a ruling was made by the office of the General Counsel that they were sustaining the ruling of the Regional Director. A copy of the charge that was filed with the National Labor Relations Board and a copy of the ruling by the office of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board are attached hereto and made a part of this petition, but not for copy.

20. Having exhausted their efforts to obtain relief through the National Labor Relations Board, these petitioners now come to this Honorable Court asserting that the consent decree heretofore filed on April 8, 1963, should be set aside because of the facts and circumstances hereinbefore set forth, and the whole matter reopened to the end that justice be done.

WHEREFORE, these petitioners (all of whom have lost their jobs with the company as a result of the aforesaid conspiracy) file this their petition for a writ of error coram nobis and ask that this Honorable Court set aside the consent decree heretofore entered and do whatever is required by law and justice.

CHAMBLISS, CHAMBLISS & HODGE,
By JAC CHAMBLISS,
Attorney for Petitioners.

STATE of TENNESSEE,
County of Hamilton:

James R. Clower, Dan McWilliams and Clyde Rector, being first duly sworn, make oath that they are petitioners in the foregoing petition for a writ of erro coram nobis and that they have read the said petition and that the facts therein set forth are true to the best of their knowledge, information and belief.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this ---- day of December, 1963.

Notary Public.

My commission expires:

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1964

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1964.

No. 241.

JAMES B. CLOWER, DAN McWILLIAMS, and CLYDE RECTOR, Intervenors,

Petitioners,

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and TENNESSEE PRODUCTS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, ROANE ELECTRIC FURNACE DIVISION,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT TENNESSEE PRODUCTS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

ARTHUR S. KEYSER,
JOSEPH BELL,
GEORGE A. BURNSTEIN,
KLEINBARD, BELL & BRECKER,
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19109,
Counsel for Respondent Tennessee Products and Chemical Corporation.

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Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT TENNESSEE PRODUCTS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board in Case No. 10-CA-4850 dated March 22, 1963, is unreported. (See Appendix, page 13.). The Consent Decree entered by the Court of Appeals enforcing the Board's Decision and Order is unreported. (See Appendix, page 19.) The Order Denying Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis is reported at 329 F. 2d 873. (See Appendix, page 26.)

QUESTION PRESENTED.

I. May employees hired as replacements during a strike, and subsequently laid off and relegated to their proper position on the seniority list for recall purposes pursuant to an Order of the National Labor Relations Board, attack such remedial Order in the Court of Appeals by means of a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The Employer operates an electric furnace plant at Rockwood, Tennessee. In September 1961, the Employer had on its active payroll approximately 405 production and maintenance employees: An additional 171 such employees were on layoff status with recall rights. At such time there was in force and effect a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Company and Union containing grievance, arbitration and no-strike provisions.

Beginning on or about 12:01 A. M. September 7, 1961, the active employees engaged in a concerted work stoppage, which continued unabated until September 9, 1961, at which time the Company discharged all of such employees. On September 13, 1961, the Company directed the laid off employees to report to work. The employees in this group refused to report as directed and, on September 24, 1961, they were also discharged.

The Company, believing the strike to be unprotected and in derogation of the no-strike provisions of the Agreement, attempted on a number of occasions to persuade the Union and the striking employees that they should return to work. When these efforts proved unavailing, the Company, on or about October 10, 1961, was compelled to reopen the Plant and operate it with replacement employees who were hired as needed throughout the period which ended with the issuance of the Board's Order on March 22, 1963.

In November 1961, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that the discharge of the active-status and layoff-status strikers was unlawful. The General Counsel of the Board thereafter issued a Complaint, and in June 1962, formal hearings thereon were held before a Trial Examiner.

In his Intermediate Report, in essence, the Trial Examiner found that there had existed in the Plant "abnor-

mally dangerous conditions for work" at the time the concerted refusal to work occurred and that such conditions were responsible for the work stoppage.

The Trial Examiner recommended that the Company be required to offer full and immediate reinstatement to all strikers affected by the abnormally dangerous gas and dust conditions, by discharging, if necessary, any replacement employees hired for the first time on or after September 9, 1961. As to strikers not directly exposed to the abnormally dangerous conditions, and as to employees who refused to return from layoff status, the Trial Examiner recommended dismissal of the Complaint.

Subsequent to issuance of the Intermediate Report, the Company, the General Counsel, and the Union all filed exceptions and briefs with the Board. The Company sought reversal of the Trial Examiner's factual findings and dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety. The General Counsel and the Union, in their respective exceptions, sought, on the other hand, to have the Board reverse the Trial Examiner's finding that strikers not directly exposed to the abnormally dangerous conditions and the laid-off employees were not entitled to the protections of the Act. The General Counsel and the Union sought the nullification of all discharges and the reinstatement of all the striking employees.

The legal issues set forth above were joined before the Board in August 1962. Thereafter, while the Board had the case under consideration, representatives of the Company, representatives of the General Counsel and representatives of the Union engaged in discussions as to the possibility of formal and final settlement of the pending unfair labor practice charges.

In such discussions, the General Counsel's representatives laid down and the Company was ultimately forced to capitulate to certain basic conditions for a final dispo-

sition of the unfair labor practice charges. Among other items, the Company was required to submit to the entry of a decree against it by the Court of Appeals; the Company was required to rescind and cancel the discharges of all striking employees; the Company was required to recall substantial numbers of the strikers, displacing, if necessary, replacement employees hired after the strikers had been discharged; and, the Company was required to pay specified sums of money to the strikers as reimbursement for lost wages during the period of time during which such remedy was deemed appropriate.

Respondent entered into such a formal Settlement Agreement with the General Counsel and the Union on February 18, 1963. Thereafter, the General Counsel tendered such Agreement t the Board. The Board thereafter reviewed and approved its terms and conditions and, on March 22, 1963, issued a Decision and Order requiring and directing the Company to comply with the various negative and affirmative provisions of such Decision and Order. (The Text of such Decision and Order appears in Appendix, pages 13 to 18.)

On March 29, 1963, the Board petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for a decree enforcing its Order against the Company. That Court issued such a Decree on April 8, 1963. Thereafter, the Company took the actions required by the Board's Order and the Court's Decree, and on June 28, 1963, the Company was advised by the Board that full compliance had been achieved and that the unfair labor practice case was being closed contingent on the Company's continued observance of the terms of the Board's Order.

On June 20, 1963, various of the replacements filed an action in Tennessee Chancery Court seeking relief from the remedial provisions of the Board's Order. This action was subsequently dismissed.

On August 26, 1963, a replacement filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging that the Company's

conduct in reinstating strikers pursuant to the Board's prior Order was an unfair labor practice. The General Counsel dismissed such charge.

Thereafter, on December 30, 1963, the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (Appendix, page 20) was lodged with the Court of Appeals. The Court's Order denying the Petition issued on April 1, 1964.

ARGUMENT.

Employees Hired as Replacements During a Strike, and Subsequently Laid Off and Relegated to Their Proper Position on the Seniority List for Recall Purposes Pursuant to an Order of the National Labor Relations Board, May Not Attack Such Remedial Order in the Court of Appeals by Means of a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

The initial difficulty with this case stems from the fact that there is no foundation below in either the Court of Appeals or before the National Labor Relations Board to support the Petition for Writ of Certiorari or give the Petitioners any standing before this Court.

The underlying case or controversy is an unfair labor practice case involving the legality or illegality of the Company's action in discharging striking employees during a labor dispute that occurred in September 1961. That case was fully investigated and litigated before the National Labor Relations Board. That unfair labor practice case ended with a Decision and Order by the Board finding that unfair labor practices had occurred and that appropriate statutory remedies were applicable.

In essence, the Board directed and required that the Company cancel and revoke the discharges of all the striking employees, and reinstate, reimburse and recall a substantial number of such employees to active employment. The strikers recalled, in each case, had greater service and seniority with the Company than the individual replacement employees who were laid off as a consequence of the Board's remedial Order.

The reinstatement remedy deemed appropriate by the Board, in its disposition of the unfair labor practice case, is the remedy authorized by the statute and is the remedy

normally and traditionally applied by the Board in unlawful discharge cases.

The Petitioners, who are apparently individuals that were laid off as part of the procedure necessary to carry out the Order of the Board, now complain because they were not invited to participate in the unfair labor practice case before the Board prior to the issuance of the Board's Decision and Order.

However, at no place in the present Petition for Writ of Certiorari or in the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis in the Court below do the Petitioners establish or articulate the basis for their alleged right to have participated in the unfair labor practice case.

None of the Petitioners were employed by the Company at the time that the alleged "abnormally dangerous conditions for work" arose. None of the Petitioners were employed by the Company at the time the strike took place and at the time the discharge of the strikers occurred. The Petitioners' first employment with the Company did not begin until all of the incidents and events material to the labor dispute and the unfair labor practice had occurred.

Petitioners were not named as parties to or in any way included in the unfair labor practice proceedings before the Board or the Court of Appeals because they were neither charged with the commission of unfair labor practices nor were they in any way involved in the merits of the dispute. Their presence was not necessary in order to enable the Board to determine whether the Company had violated the statute or to make an appropriate remedial order against the Company. *N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines*, 303 U. S. 261; *General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co.*, 260 U. S. 261, 285-286.

It is clear that Petitioners, as strangers to the unfair labor practice proceeding, had no right to there intervene. Moreover, it is clear that Petitioners never made any attempt to so intervene. Finally, it is clear that the Board

could not have permitted any such intervention, since such action would not have served any practical or proper legal purpose in the resolution of the unfair labor practice case.

In short, as established in the foregoing discussion, Petitioners are not parties to or privy to any of the prior proceedings in connection with the resolution of the unfair labor practice case, and they therefore have no standing to bring themselves or that case before this Court by means of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The second basic defect in the Petitioners' position stems from their misunderstanding of the nature of the Board's function in relation to this type of unfair labor practice case. The Board, in the exercise of its authority under the National Labor Relations Act, and in connection with the case here under discussion, of necessity, had to resolve the rights of the strikers to their jobs. Having once established that unfair labor practices had occurred, the Board was then required to and did direct the necessary remedial actions to nullify the impact of the unfair labor practices on the unlawfully discharged employees.

Once the necessary remedial steps and corrective actions had been taken, and these actions were completed to the Board's satisfaction on or about June 28, 1963, the unfair labor practice case was closed and fully disposed of. Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis on December 30, 1963, even if otherwise meritorious, was at a minimum six months too late.

Here, it should be made clear that the Petitioners have not been deprived of their jobs or suffered other injury by the Board's Order or the Decree of the Court of Appeals enforcing such Order. It is apparent on the face of Paragraph 2(d) (Appendix, page 16) of the Board's Decision and Order that both the strikers and the replacements have been retained as employees of the Company with senority and recall rights. All that has happened in this situation is that employees with greater seniority are now actively at work pursuant to a traditional and authorized remedial

order issued by the responsible Government Agency having exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter of this dispute.

The reduction in the relative seniority status of the replacements is not a deprivation of their rights, but rather is the natural and inevitable consequence of the fact that the Board has determined that other employees, with rights superior to those of the replacements, are entitled to have such superior rights recognized, protected and enforced by the Order of the Board that is here under assault.

The Court is here confronted with a request that if granted will subject this Court, the various Courts of Appeals, and the Board to unceasing, unending and unfruitful litigation in connection with the administration of the National Labor Relations Act. If any person indirectly or incidentally affected by an Order of the Board in an unfair labor practice case is permitted to attack such Order in the Federal Appellate Courts without regard to his formal status in the case or without regard to the fact that he has presented no charge to the Board recognizable under the Act, chaos must result. At a minimum, private parties will assume control of unfair labor practice litigation and will supplant the General Counsel of the Board, who thus far has been deemed to have exclusive power to initiate such litigation. *Hourihan v. N. L. R. B.*, 201 F. 2d 187 (C. A. D. C.), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 930; *Bandlow v. Rothman*, 278 F. 2d 866 (C. A. D. C.), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 909. Additionally, it will become impossible for any party to settle or otherwise adjust any matter with the Board at any step short of ultimate enforcement after adversary litigation in a Court of Appeals, since any such adjustment will apparently be open to collateral attack by all persons who may consider themselves to be dissatisfied with the Board's ultimate determination of the merits of the case.

The Court of Appeals, in its Order Denying the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (Appendix, page 26) correctly noted that there existed no basis under either the National Labor Relations Act or the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure for that Court to entertain such an application in connection with this matter. It is respectfully submitted that Petitioners cannot here obtain relief from denial of an application that was and is unauthorized in law.

Aside from the basic procedural defect in Petitioners' application to the Court of Appeals, as noted above, there are obvious and basic substantive defects that caused the Court of Appeals to deny such application. Essentially, the Petitioners in the Court below asserted three grounds as a basis for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

First, they voiced dissatisfaction with the terms of the Board's remedial Order. Mere dissatisfaction, however, does not establish an entitlement to judicial relief. Second, they complained because they had not been given an opportunity to be heard before the National Labor Relations Board. Clearly, they had no right to be heard by the Board, and before both the Court of Appeals and this Court they have been unable to establish the basis of their claim in this regard. Third, and finally, they complained because the General Counsel of the Board had refused to issue an unfair labor practice Complaint attacking their layoffs. They have thus far presented no facts that would justify the Court of Appeals in taking the extraordinary step of directing the General Counsel to take such action in their behalf.

It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals, *N. L. R. B. v. Tennessee Products and Chemical Corp.*, 329 F. 2d 873, here complained of, adequately, properly and correctly disposed of Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

CONCLUSION.

There is no case or controversy below that gives rise to the present Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The Petitioners are strangers to the unfair labor practice case, and their complaints are foreign to that case. Petitioners have not, in fact, been deprived of their rights or suffered a

denial of a hearing. Petitioners' dissatisfaction stems from the fact that other employees, with superior rights, have displaced them from immediate active employment. A Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis to a United States Court of Appeals is not available and is not appropriate as a means of asserting such alleged individual grievances.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari pending before this Court should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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JOSEPH BELL,
GEORGE A. BURNSTEIN,
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Counsel for Respondent Tennessee Products and Chemical Corporation.

APPENDIX.

DECISION AND ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IN CASE NO. 10-CA-4850.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On June 14, 1962, Trial Examiner Owsley Vose issued his Intermediate Report and Recommended Order in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it take specific action to remedy such unfair labor practices. Thereafter, all parties filed exceptions and briefs with the Board in support of their respective positions as to the allegations of the Complaint and findings and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.

Thereafter, on February 18, 1963, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, herein called the Respondent; United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union; and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, entered into a Stipulation, in settlement of the case, subject to approval of the Board, providing for the entry of a consent order by the Board and a consent decree by any appropriate United States Court of Appeals. The parties withdrew their exceptions and briefs and waived all further and other procedure before the Board to which they may be entitled under the Act, and the Rules and Regulations of the Board, and waived their right to contest the entry of a consent decree or to receive further notice of the application therefor.

The aforesaid Stipulation is hereby approved and made a part of the record herein, and the proceeding is hereby

transferred to and continued before the Board for the entry of a Decision and Order, pursuant to the provisions of the said Stipulation.

Upon the basis of the aforesaid Stipulation and the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following:

Findings of Fact.

1. *The business of the Respondent.*

Respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, a Tennessee corporation, annually ships goods valued in excess of $50,000.00 from its manufacturing facilities in Tennessee to points and persons located outside the State of Tennessee. The Respondent admits, and we find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

2. *The labor organization involved.*

United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

Order.

Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, the Stipulation, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that:

The Respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, its officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Discharging employees for engaging in strike or concerted activities protected by the Act, or in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join or assist any labor organ-

ization to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

(b) Discouraging membership in the International Union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by discharging employees or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of their employment.

2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended:

(a) As promptly as possible consistent with operating requirements, recall the employees found by the Trial Examiner to have been affected by the alleged abnormally dangerous working conditions at its plant on September 5 and 6, 1961. The names of all such affected employees (seventy-seven in number) are contained in Appendix "B" hereto, which is hereby incorporated into this Order as a part hereof. The employees recalled pursuant to this Section 2(a) shall be recalled in an order consistent with seniority subject to operating requirements and there shall be laid off an equivalent number of employees hired for the first time after September 11, 1961.

(b) In addition to the recall of the employees provided for in Paragraph 2(a) above, as promptly as possible consistent with operating requirements, recall a number of employees who participated in the work stoppage which shall represent the difference between said number of seventy-seven (77) and the number which is equal to two-thirds (⅔) of the total number

of employees actively at work in the bargaining unit on the date of this Order. The employees recalled pursuant to this Section 2(b) shall be recalled in an order consistent with seniority subject to operating requirements and there shall be laid off an equivalent number of employees hired for the first time after September 11, 1961.

(c) Terminate all discharges communicated to its employees beginning September 11, 1961 and arising out of the work stoppage beginning on or about September 6, 1961. Pay to each of said employees who was actively at work in the bargaining unit on September 6, 1961 an amount of money herein agreed to be the net amount due him as a result of such discharge. The names of all such employees are contained in Appendix "C" hereto, which is hereby incorporated into this Order as a part hereof, and the amount of money due each such employee appears opposite such employee's name.

The employees whose discharges are terminated pursuant to this Paragraph 2(c) but who are not recalled to work pursuant to the provisions of Paragraphs 2(a) or (b) hereof shall be restored to the master seniority list referred to in Paragraph 2(d) below.

(d) Establish a master seniority list containing the names of all persons who were employees in the collective bargaining unit on September 6, 1961 and all persons hired thereafter who are now at work and those who have rights to recall. Such seniority list is attached hereto as Appendix "D", which is hereby incorporated into this Order as a part hereof. The employees on said list have been ranked in order of seniority for recall purposes. There are no other em-

ployees or former employees who have any seniority rights as of the date of this Stipulation.

(e) In the event that a person to be recalled in accordance with the provisions of this Order is not qualified to do the work, the next highest ranked employee qualified to do the work will be recalled. The Company is directed to work out reasonable notice and reporting requirements with the Union in order to implement the provisions of this Order.

(f) Recalls under the provisions of Paragraphs 2(a) and (b) hereof will be accomplished as quickly as possible and in any event within (30) days from the date the job becomes available and the Employer is advised of the employee's availability to perform such job.

(g) A recalled employee shall be required to be examined by a Company physician for the purpose of determining whether he has incurred any injury or illness which will prevent him from performing his job.

(h) Post in conspicuous places in its plant at Rockwood, Tennessee, including all places where notices to employees are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as Appendix "A", which Appendix is hereby incorporated into and is to become a part of this Order. Copies of said Notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Employer's representative, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Employer to insure that said Notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.

(i) Upon entry of a Court Decree enforcing this Order, the Employer shall notify the Regional Di-

rector for the Tenth Region, in writing, within twenty (20) days after notice of entry of such Decree, as to the steps taken by the Respondent to comply herewith.

Dated, Washington, D. C., MAR 22 1963.

FRANK W. McCULLOCH,
Chairman

PHILIP RAY RODGERS,
Member

BOYD LEEDOM,
Member

JOHN H. FANNING,
Member

GERALD A. BROWN,
Member

(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

CONSENT DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

THIS CAUSE was submitted upon the petition of the National Labor Relations Board for the enforcement of a certain order issued by it against Respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, its officers, agents, successors and assigns on March 22, 1963, in a proceeding before the said Board numbered 10-CA-4850; upon the transcript of the record in said proceeding, certified and filed in this Court, and upon a stipulation providing for the entry of a consent decree of this Court enforcing the order.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that the said order of the National Labor Relations Board be, and the same is hereby enforced; and that Respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, its officers, agents, successors and assigns abide by and perform the direction of the Board in said order contained.

/s/ CLIFFORD O'SULLIVAN.
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS.

Petitioners for a writ of error corum nobis, who seek to intervene in this cause, are citizens of Tennessee.

The National Labor Relations Board, which is mentioned as the petitioner in this cause, is an administrative body duly constituted by the Congress of the United States for the purpose of enforcing certain statutes of the United States dealing with matters of labor relations. The Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division, which appears as respondent in this case, is a Tennessee corporation having plants in Tennessee and engaging in interstate commerce so as to be within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, which is mentioned in the transcript of the record in the proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board at the time of the consent decree, is a labor organization doing business in Tennessee and throughout the United States.

Petitioners respectfully file this their petition for a writ of error coram nobis in this cause and would show unto the Court the following:

This Honorable Court heretofore and on the 8th day of April, 1963, put down an order in this cause, said order being designated a consent decree.

This order was put down without any notice thereof being given to petitioners and without their being a party thereto, although their rights were involved therein, as hereinafter set forth:

1. Petitioners are a part of a group of approximately two hundred (200) employees of Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division.

2. In September 1961 the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, had a contract as representing the employees of Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, Roane Electric Furnace Division

(which will hereinafter be called Tennessee Products), said contract providing that the Union would be recognized as representing the company's employees, and said contract also making provision for wages, hours and working conditions. This contract provided that it would terminate on September 15, 1962.

3. In Septen ber 1961, the Union struck at the company's plant, said strike being in violation of the then existing labor contract.

4. Following the calling of this strike, the company, which had been repeatedly harassed by a series of such illegal strikes, discharged the approximately four hundred fifteen (415) employees who had gone on said strike and began to replace said strikers with other workers, most of whom had never worked for the company before.

5. In hiring these workers to replace the discharged strikers, the company represented that it was hiring them on a permanent rather than a temporary basis, and that if said employees would accept employment, the company would protect them in their job rights and in the event the Union sought to force the re-employment of the discharged employees through the medium of the National Labor Relations Board, the company would contest such re-employment through the Supreme Court of the United States.

6. Petitioners and their fellow employees, totalling approximately two hundred (200), accepted employment by the company under these terms and went to work for the company, with the result that with a work force of less than fifty per cent (50%) of that formerly employed, the company operated with a better production record than it had prior to the strike.

7. Thereafter the Union filed charges against the company before the National Labor Relations Board, claiming that the company's action in discharging the four hundred fifteen (415) strikers was unlawful. This was done in Case

10-CA-4850, to which reference is made, the contents of this file having heretofore been filed with this Court, according to the consent decree.

8. Petitioners were not parties to the aforesaid proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board.

9. As reflected by the file in said case, a hearing officer was assigned to hear the case and after hearing the same, he ruled that although approximately seventy-seven (77) of the discharged strikers were justified in striking, because of dangerous working conditions, and should be rehired, all the rest of the four hundred fifteen (415) strikers had been lawfully discharged. He therefore recommended that the company he required to reinstate the seventy-seven (77) and to pay them back pay.

10. Thereafter, the company announced to these petitioners and their fellow employees that the decision would be appealed to the Courts.

11. However, instead of appealing said decision, which was handed down in the summer of 1962, the company, without advising petitioners and their fellow employees, subsequently entered into a conspiracy and deal with the Union and with representatives of the National Labor Relations Board which violated the rights of the petitioners and their fellow employees and unlawfully and unconstitutionally deprived them of their rights and their jobs, said conspiracy consisting of the actions hereinafter alleged.

12. The company, being fearful that it would have to pay the sum of approximately one million dollars to the 77 employees whom it had been ordered to rehire, agreed that if the Union would drop the demands insofar as said back pay was concerned, the company would not only rehire those 77 Union members who had been held to have been wrongfully discharged, but would also rehire substantially all the other strikers who had been ruled to have been lawfully discharged and would discharge petitioners and their fellow employees in order to effect this.

13. The Union, the company and the National Labor Relations Board (secretly, insofar as the then company employees were concerned) agreed to this action, thus depriving the 77 wrongfully discharged employees of their rights to back pay and also depriving petitioners and their fellow employees of their rights and their jobs, illegally and unconstitutionally.

14. This action was illegal because in March of 1963, when this agreement was reached and a new contract signed by the company and the Union, the Union did not actually represent the employees of the company because of the fact that their contract with the company had expired in September of 1962 and it was obvious on the face of the record that thereafter they were not the bargaining agency for the employees of the company, who at that time consisted of petitioners and their fellow employees.

15. The action was unconstitutional because of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it deprived petitioners and their fellow employees of their property rights and their jobs without due process of law in that they were not advised as to what was being done and were given no opportunity to appear and present their side of the case whatsoever, said action being taken by the National Labor Relations Board and the company and the Union in a secret and surreptitious manner insofar as these petitioners and their fellow employees were concerned, it being some weeks later before petitioners and their fellow employees found out anything about it.

16. The individuals involved who acted on behalf of the parties in this cause were Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Assistant General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, and Joseph Bell, attorney for the company. Petitioners herein do not know the name of the individual who acted on behalf of the Union, but charge that said information can be furnished by the individuals heretofore named.

17. Following their discovery of the situation, petitioners and their fellow employees employed counsel who

undertook to obtain relief through the National Labor Relations Board by filing a charge with that organization on August 23, 1963, it being hoped that the Labor Board would take some action to undo the grossly unfair and illegal arrangement that had been made and entered into.

18. However, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board in Atlanta refused to issue a complaint.

19. Thereafter, an appeal was taken to the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, and under date of November 6, 1963, a ruling was made by the office of the General Counsel that they were sustaining the ruling of the Regional Director. A copy of the charge that was filed with the National Labor Relations Board and a copy of the ruling by the office of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board are attached hereto and made a part of this petition, but not for copy.

20. Having exhausted their efforts to obtain relief through the National Labor Relations Board, these petitioners now come to this Honorable Court asserting that the consent decree heretofore filed on April 8, 1963, should be set aside because of the facts and circumstances hereinbefore set forth, and the whole matter reopened to the end that justice be done.

WHEREFORE, these petitioners (all of whom have lost their jobs with the company as a result of the aforesaid conspiracy) file this their petition for a writ of error coram nobis and ask that this Honorable Court set aside the consent decree heretofore entered and do whatever is required by law and justice.

CHAMBLISS, CHAMBLISS & HODGE,

By .....
Jac Chambliss,
Attorneys for Petitioners.

STATE OF TENNESSEE }
COUNTY OF HAMILTON } ss.:

James R. Clower, Dan McWilliams and Clyde Rector, being first duly sworn, make oath that they are petitioners in the foregoing petition for a writ of error coram nobis and that they have read the said petition and that the facts therein set forth are true to the best of their knowledge, information and belief.

.....

.....

.....

Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of December, 1963.

.....
Notary Public.

My commission expires:

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS.

Before O'SULLIVAN, PHILLIPS, and EDWARDS, *Circuit Judges.*

This matter is presented to us by a pleading entitled Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis. On April 8, 1963, this court, in this cause, entered a consent decree enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board. This order, entered pursuant to a settlement agreement between the National Labor Relations Board and respondent, Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation, required, *inter alia*, that respondent rehire certain employees that it had discharged during the course of a strike, laying off, if necessary, employees who had replaced such discharged employees. The pleading before us is signed by three of such laid off employees. The relief sought is the vacation of our order of April 8, 1963, and the doing of "whatever is required by law and justice."

The petition avers the following facts as the grounds for relief. During the course of a strike respondent discharged the strikers. These employees were represented by United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Respondent company then began to replace the discharged strikers with other men, among which were petitioners.[1]

The AFL-CIO union, on behalf of the discharged strikers, thereupon filed with the NLRB a charge that respondent company was guilty of an unfair labor practice in discharging the strikers. A hearing was had and a Trial Examiner's report found that the company had violated the Act, by discharging some seventy-seven of the striking employees. The report held, however, that the remaining

[1] Petitioners assert that some 200 replacements were hired, and we assume that the named petitioners seek to assert the rights of all in that class.

strikers were not, during the work stoppage, engaged in a protected activity. The company was ordered to reinstate the seventy-seven. The Union and the Board's general counsel took exception to the Trial Examiner's report and contended that all strikers, a total of about four hundred, should be reinstated with back pay. Pending hearing before the Board, a settlement was reached whereby the company agreed to an order calling for the reinstatement of all the discharged Union members, laying off, if necessary, those that had replaced them. Our decree of April 8, 1963, enforced such order. We are asked coram nobis to vacate our decree.

While coram nobis, as a civil writ, was abolished by Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it was permitted survival or revival in criminal practice by *United States v. Morgan*, 346 U. S. 502, 98 L. Ed. 248. Our function in litigation arising under the National Labor Relations Act is well defined by that Act, and we find nothing therein giving us the right to entertain original applications for writs of error coram nobis. We doubt, too, whether in such matters we have any general equity powers.

Apart, however, from procedural labels, we do not think that the present address to us calls for or permits action on our part. We need not decide whether the present petitioners would or should have been allowed to intervene in the above-entitled cause, had a request therefor been made to the NLRB or to us before the matter was finalized by our decree. After our decree, one or more of the present petitioners did file with the appropriate Regional Director of the NLRB a charge asserting that what was accomplished by the carrying out of the settlement, approved and enforced by our decree, and which resulted in the layoff of some or all of these who replaced the reinstated strikers, was an unfair labor practice. The Regional Director of the NLRB, as well as its general counsel, refused to issue a complaint. In the case of *Dunn v. Retail*

Clerks, 307 F. (2d) 285 (CA 6, 1962), we held that neither a District Court nor ourselves have power, by mandamus or otherwise, to command the NLRB to issue such a complaint. Such, too, was the holding in *Hourihan v. NLRB*, 201 F. (2d) 187 (CA.—D. C., 1952), cert. den., 346 U. S. 930, and *Bandlow v. Rothman*, 278 F. (2d) 866 (CA.—D. C., 1960), cert. den. 364 U. S. 909. As we stated in *Dunn v. Retail Clerks, supra:*

> "Congress has invested the N. L. R. B. and its agents with powers which, if withheld or abused, can visit serious and irreparable harm upon those who, under the scheme of the N. L. R. A. cannot obtain the help of judicial intervention. Foreclosed as we are from entrance by judicial writ into such a situation, we must leave an injured party to the assistance of those empowered to apply administrative remedies or executive correction." (307 F. (2d) 289)

The petition before us also infers that when the petitioners were hired as replacements for the strikers, promises were made which might give them some contractual rights to continued employment. But, whatever the status of petitioners' alleged contractual rights, this court is not the forum in which to vindicate them. Our function is fundamentally appellate in NLRB matters. It has been held that, since administrative bodies are created to serve the public interest, they are not a proper forum for the litigation of private contractual rights. *Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.*, 309 U. S. 261, 268, 84 L. Ed. 738, 743 (1939).

The petition now before us is denied.

Approved for entry.

CLIFFORD O'SULLIVAN,
United States Circuit Judge.

SUPREME COURT, U. S.

No. 241

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AUG 18 1964
JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964.

JAMES B. CLOWER, DAN McWILLIAMS, and CLYDE RECTOR, Intervenors,

Petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and TENNESSEE PRODUCTS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, ROANE ELECTRIC FURNACE DIVISION,

Respondents.

REPLY TO BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

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ROANE ELECTRIC FURNACE DIVISION,

Respondents.

REPLY TO BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

Two matters set out as fact in the agreement of the respondents are not factually correct.

The brief of respondent Tennessee Products states that "That case was fully investigated and litigated before the National Labor Relations Board. That unfair labor practice case ended with a decision, and Order by the Board finding that unfair labor practices had occurred and that appropriate statutory remedies were applicable." (Page 6, brief of Tennessee Products.)

As shown in the brief of the National Labor Relations Board (page 3), the litigation before the Board was not fully litigated, but was settled without any formal hearing or "litigation" before the Board or before the Court of Appeals.

Secondly, the settlement was without notice to the petitioners, despite the statement to the contrary on page

7 of the respondent National Labor Relations Board's brief. (See page 3, line 7, of the petitioner's brief.)

Actually, whether the firing of the approximately four hundred strikers was illegal was not settled by litigation before the National Labor Relations Board, but by agreement entered into between the Union, Tennessee Products, and the attorneys for the National Labor Relations Board, *and both the National Labor Relations Board and the Court of Appeals merely approved that agreement.*

Respectfully submitted,

JAC CHAMBLISS,

Counsel for Petitioners.